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Abstract
Technical integration between companies can result in an increased risk of information security
breaches. This thesis proposes a methodology for quantifying information security risk to a
supply chain participant. Given a system responsible for supply chain interaction and the
vulnerabilities attributed to the system, the variables that determine the probability and severity
of security incidents were used to create a model to quantify the risk within three hypothetical
information systems. The probability of an incident occurring was determined by rating the
availability and ease of performing an exploit, the attractiveness of the target and an estimate of
the frequency of the attack occurring internet wide. In assigning a monetary value to the
incident, the outcome from an attack was considered in terms of the direct impact on the business
process and the potential impact on partnerships. A method for determining mitigation strategies
was then proposed based on a given set of monetary constraints and the realization of corporate
security policy.
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2
Acknowledgements
Firstly, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. George Kocur. His generous support, guidance,
and kind manner made this thesis experience enjoyable. Dr. Chris Caplice for his dedication to
the improvement of the MLOG program and in turn his commitment to all MLOG students.
I would like to thank my colleagues at NetSec for their encouragement and assistance with my
project. The ideas and advice that were so generously shared by Martyn Ruks and Tom Parker
were greatly appreciated. I would like to thank Jack Whitsett for his generous gift of time to help
me gather data and tirelessly offer me guidance. I would also like to acknowledge Glenn Hazard
for his endorsement of my time at MLOG, and David Howorth for always being ready to offer
kind words, suggestions and support.
Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their boundless support and encouragement
beginning at my first breath. Without their impassioned belief in the value of education and hard
work, I would not be where I am today. Spending this year with my sister and parents in Boston,
after many years away from home, has been a real pleasure.
3
Table of Contents
A bstract..............................................................................................................................2
Acknow ledgem ents....................................................................................................... 3
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................... 4
List of Figures....................................................................................................................6
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... 7
List of Equations ........................................................................................................ 8
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 9
2 M otivation ................................................................................................................. 11
3 Literature Review ................................................................................................ 14
3.1 Classification of Inform ation Security Incidents.............................................. 14
3.2 Im pact of Security Breaches ........................................................................... 16
3.3 Risk Assessm ent ............................................................................................ 17
4 Inform ation Security Risk .................................................................................. 19
4.1 Detailed Description of Inform ation Security Classification............................ 19
4.2 Events ................................................................................................................. 20
4.3 Attacks ................................................................................................................ 21
4.4 Incidents.............................................................................................................. 22
4.5 Examples of Adverse Effects of Unauthorized Results to a Supply Chain....... 23
4.5.1 Disclosure of Inform ation ......................................................................... 23
4.5.2 Corruption of Inform ation ......................................................................... 24
4.5.3 Denial of Service ..................................................................................... 24
5 M ethodology.............................................................................................................26
5.1 Asset Identification ......................................................................................... 26
5.1.1 The Manufacturer's Order Management System.................................... 28
5.1.2 The Distributor's O rder M anagem ent System ......................................... 29
5.1.3 The Customer's System for Trading Partner Communication................ 30
5.2 Vulnerability Assessm ent ................................................................................ 30
5.2.1 Probability of an Unauthorized Result..................................................... 32
5.2.2 Unauthorized Results Considered......................................................... 38
5.3 Quantifying Impact on an Asset of an Unauthorized Result ......................... 39
5.3.1 Costs Related to a Loss in Availability .................................................... 40
5.3.2 Costs Related to a Loss of Inform ation Integrity ..................................... 40
5.3.3 Costs Related to a Loss of Information Confidentiality .......................... 41
5.3.4 Alternative Method for Calculating Consequences................................ 42
5.4 Expected Value of Loss Calculation ............................................................. 42
5.5 Risk M itigation Plan ....................................................................................... 43
6 Sam ple Risk Assessm ent .................................................................................. 45
4
6.1 Asset Identification ..................................................................... 45
6.2 Vulnerability Assessment ................................................................................ 46
6.3 Quantifying the Impact on Asset of Unauthorized Result .............................. 47
6.3.1 Manufacturer System Outcomes ........................................................... 48
6.3.2 Distributor System Outcomes .................................................................. 50
6.3.3 Customer System Outcomes .................................................................. 51
6.3.4 Risk Rating - Calculation of the Expected Loss ..................................... 52
6.4 R isk M itigation P lans .................................................................................... 54
6.4.1 Scenarios............................................ 54
6.4.2 Distributor Mitigation Plan ....................................................................... 56
6 .4 .3 M a nufacture r ........................................................................................... . 59
6 .4 .4 C usto m e r ............................................................................................... . 6 1
6.5 Sensitivity Analysis ........................................................................ ... 62
7 C onclusio ns .............................................................................................................. 65
8 Future Research...................................................................................................68
B ibliography .................................................................... . .. ............ ............... 70
A A ppend ix A .............................................................................................................. 71
B A ppend ix B ................................................................................... ... .................. .74
5
List of Figures
Figure 1: ISO 7498-2 Classification of Information Security Threats ........................... 14
Figure 2: Sandia Computer and Network Incident Taxonomy...................................... 19
Figure 3: Event Scenarios - Logical action and target combinations.......................... 20
Figure 4: Attacker and Objectives Relationship ........................................................... 23
Figure 5: Network Diagram - Manufacturer's Order Management System................. 28
Figure 6: Network Diagram - Distributor System......................................................... 29
Figure 7: Network Diagram - Customer System......................................................... 30
Figure 8: Attacker and Objectives Relationship ........................................................... 34
Figure 9: Base Score and Corresponding Probability.................................................. 38
Figure 10: Manufacturer's System Outcomes from Undesired Results ...................... 48
Figure 11: Distributor's System Outcomes from Undesired Results ........................... 50
Figure 12: Customer's System Outcomes from Undesired Results ............................ 51
6
List of Tables
Table 1: Threat Agent Description ................................................................................ 15
Table 2: Ease of Use Scoring Model ........................................................................... 33
Table 3: Availability of Exploit Scoring......................................................................... 33
Table 4: Attractiveness of Target Scoring .................................................................... 35
Table 5: Frequency of Attack Internet Wide.................................................................. 37
Table 6: Classification of Expected Value of Loss as a Percentage of Annual Revenue43
Table 7: Asset Inventory List for the Three Systems .................................................... 45
Table 8: Manufacturer System Vulnerabilities Identified.............................................. 46
Table 9: Distributor System Vulnerabilities Identified.................................................. 47
Table 10: Customer System Vulnerabilities Identified ................................................. 47
Table 11 : Classification of Expected Value of Loss as a Percentage of Annual Revenue
.................................................................................................................................... 
5 2
Table 12: Vulnerabilities and Corresponding Expected Value of Loss ....................... 53
Table 13: Comparison of Percentage Annual Revenue at Risk Across the Three
S y ste m s ...................................................................................................................... 5 3
Table 14: Annual Security Budget Calculation ............................................................. 55
Table 15: Manufacturer Cost to Perform Mitigating Action ......................................... 55
Table 16: Distributor Cost to Perform Mitigating Action................................................ 56
Table 17: Customer Cost to Perform Mitigating Action................................................ 56
Table 18: Distributor Mitigation Plan with Budgetary Constraints................................ 56
Table 19: Manufacturer Mitigation Plan with Budgetary Constraints............................ 59
Table 20: Customer Mitigation Plan with Budgetary Constraints ................................. 61
Table 21: Vulnerability Reference................................................................................ 74
7
List of Equations
Equation 1: Vulnerability Base Score .......................................................................... 37
Equation 2: Expected Value of Loss Calculation ....................................................... 42
8
I Introduction
Efficiencies and improvements in supply chain interactions have been achieved through the use
of technology to support information transfer and collaboration. The electronic tools that have
delivered these benefits to companies' supply chains may present potential risk to both the
reputation and financial standing of the beneficiary companies, as a result of information security
breaches. As companies that have benefited from sharing information are aware, the value of
information is often considered to be at least as important as the value of physical assets.
Protecting the confidentiality, integrity, accuracy and accessibility of company information is
important to a firm's ability to function in today's supply chains.
Understanding the risk that information security breaches can pose to the supply chain is
important not only in for an operational perspective, but in order to comply with regulations such
as Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. Further any company that holds individual customer data must
comply to standards for the protection of that data though laws such as the California Security
Breach Information Act, Senate Bill 1386 of 2002 or in the case of the healthcare industry,
patient data as regulated by Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA). The expectation of maintaining the security of other company's data may also be
specified in procurement or partnership contracts.
This thesis will describe a methodology for performing a quantitative risk assessment on three
partners in a supply chain. This assessment will be comprised of an asset identification phase, a
9
vulnerability assessment phase, an outcome identification phase and finally the calculation of
expected loss phase. Once the expected value of loss has been determined, mitigation plans to
address four different company objectives, minimizing expected value of loss, loss of
availability, loss of information integrity and information disclosure, are proposed.
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2 Motivation
Several studies have concluded companies can greatly improve their supply chain performance
through online collaboration. Kapucinski, Zhang, Carbonneau, Moore and Reeves (2004) found
that Dell could obtain $43 million in potential annual savings through "e-commerce and
manufacturing initiatives" aimed at lowering inventory held by their suppliers at Dell
manufacturing facilities. Savings of this magnitude are certainly in the best interest of
companies, but the risk that online collaboration may pose to a company must also be considered
so that the necessary mitigation strategies can be put in place.
As online collaboration within the supply chain increases, the potential consequence of an attack
resulting in a loss of availability, loss of data integrity or unauthorized disclosure of information
also increases. The SCOR model identifies five supply chain management processes: source,
deliver, make, plan and return (Huan, S, Sheoran, S, Wang, G., (2004). There are commercially
available and internally developed software applications that have been developed to facilitate
these processes. The prospect of one or more of these functions being crippled due to an
application being unavailable could result in financial losses for the company. Further, the
inability to service customers during that unavailability could impact a company's reputation and
customer relationships, possibly resulting in customers ceasing to trade with the affected
company.
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A company's assets are now being considered as not only the physical inventory, property and
staff of the firm, but also as the information that the company possesses. Information security
breaches resulting in a loss of data integrity or the disclosure of sensitive information to other
unwanted parties are another potential risk to a company's financial position. Supply chain
collaboration activities require the exchange of data, much of it sensitive, with trusted partners. A
breach of a company's information systems could result in the disclosure not only of its
information, but also its trading partners' sensitive data. Typically collaboration is practiced with
a company's most critical trading partners. Potentially losing a trading partner as a result of data
corruption would have a negative impact on a company.
Compliance with regulations is also making the need to evaluate information security within
firms a priority. The introduction of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) has made it
imperative for companies to recognize, quantify and manage risks within a corporation. The
section of SOX that is of particular relevance to supply chain related information security
concerns is section 404. This section requires an internal controls report which should include
the following: "a statement of management's responsibility for establishing and maintaining
adequate internal control over financial reporting for the company; management's assessment of
the effectiveness of the company's internal control over financial reporting as of the end of the
company's most recent fiscal year; a statement identifying the framework used by management to
evaluate the effectiveness of the company's internal control over financial reporting; and a
statement that the registered public accounting firm that audited the company's financial
statements included in the annual report has issued an attestation report on management's
assessment of the company's internal control over financial reporting" (Sarbanes Oxley Act of
12
2002). The obvious result of the reporting requirements put in place by SOX are that record
keeping and data integrity are critical.
Regulations around data protection are also important to be considered in the context of supply
chain. Systems which contain individual customer data are also being subject to regulations.
Recent laws passed in California (California Security Breach Information Act, Senate Bill 1386
of 2002) and being proposed nationally have made it necessary for companies to divulge any
security breach resulting in the disclosure of personal information. Companies that supply
hospitals with patient specific goods, such as medical surgical supplies, may also have to comply
with the standards for protecting data as defined in HIPAA.
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3 Literature Review
3.1 Classification of Information Security Incidents
In order to discuss information security risk, we must first establish a classification of threats.
One method for the classification of threats is set out in the IS07498-2 document. It defines risk
to information assets as the destruction of information, corruption/modification of information,
the theft, removal or loss of information, the disclosure of information and the interruption of
services as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: ISO 7498-2 Classification of Information Security Threats
Infrmation
Destruction g
Information LsofOf Service
Disclosure -of
Corruption/modificatin trnfomationOf Information
Source: ISO 7498-2
Farahmand and Navathe (2002) present a more detailed method of classifying threats. They look
at security threats with regard to two factors, the threat agent and the penetration technique. In
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their view a threat is executed by a threat agent employing a technique. Threat agents are
described as one of three types, unauthorized user, authorized user and environmental factors.
Table 1: Threat Agent Description
THREAT AGENT DESCRIPTON OF THREAT AGENT
Authorized Users Authorized users be unwitting threat agents if they commit
errors. Authorized users can also intentionally cause a
threat if they exceed their privileges or authorization level.
Unauthorized Users Unauthorized users are defined as anyone who interrupts
the productivity of the system by either covert or over
means.
Environmental Factors Environmental influences such as fires or natural disasters
such as floods.
Source: Farahmond and Navathe (2003)
The techniques that are employed by threat agents to create the threat are described by
Farahmond (2003) as physical, personnel, hardware, software and procedural. Physical
techniques are as one would assume, gaining entry into a restricted area that to access a computer
room or other sensitive area. The threat from personnel can be manifested in two ways, a
malicious threat and an unwitting threat. The malicious threat is that of an employee that is either
disgruntled or can obtain some benefit from an attack, either assists an outsider or executes an
attack. Employees can also be tricked into performing a malicious act without their knowledge.
This is often referred to as social engineering. Social engineering can be performed in a phone
call asking for details about the company or can be elaborate schemes that involve long time
frames and the development of relationships with the staff. Hardware and software techniques
simply refer to the attacks that can be mounted against these assets. The threat from procedures
is the one of authorized or unauthorized users penetrating a system due to a lack of controls, such
as password policies not being enforced.
The method that seems to the author to be the most comprehensive in defining a framework
within which to describe information security risk is one defined by Howard and Longstaff
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(1998). This method looks at security breaches from the perspective on security incidents which
are made up of attacks and their corresponding events. This method gives a framework for best
describing the context and outcomes of security events. The reason for this method being
preferred beyond its comprehensive nature is that it provides an ability to put into context data
that is generated by security devices that are widely deployed throughout company networks.
This framework will be further discussed in Chapter 3.
3.2 Impact of Security Breaches
There has also been some work done assessing the financial impact of information security
breaches, although none of it specific to supply chain applications. Garg, Curtis, and Halper
(2003) state that most previous work quantifying the financial impact of information security
breaches has been through the analysis of self-reporting surveys conducted by CERT, the FBI
and other organizations. Garg et al (2003) sought to determine the financial impact of a security
breach by using an event-study methodology. By observing the impact on a company's
performance in the public markets following the publication of a non-virus related information
security event, they hoped to determine the financial impact of such a breach. They found that
security breaches did have an impact on financial performance ranging from a relatively minimal
average effect of 1.1 percent reduction in share price over three days for web defacement attacks
to 36 percent reduction in share value over three days for Egghead following an incident that put
customer credit card information at risk. The type of company also had an impact on the severity
of a market response to an event, whereas the average response to a web-defacement was a 1.1
percent drop in share price, while an Internet security company, RSA lost 17.1% of their market
cap value following a web-defacement (Garg 2003).
Garg et al (2003) classified incidents in the following manner:
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1. Web site defacement
2. Denial of service
3. Theft of customer information
4. Theft of credit card information
They found that the theft of credit card information had the most negative impact on stock
performance, most likely because of the perceived liability for the company from such a threat.
The type of companies examined in the Garg et al (2003) study is deemed to be Internet
dependent firms including: Staples, Travelocity, Yahoo, Microsoft, Time Warner and Diageo.
While this study does have an interesting method for quantifying reputation issues, it does not
address issues that do not become public. It also does not address issues where there is a
disruption of service.
Another approach to quantifying information security risk was performed by Gordon and Loeb
(2002). They looked to derive an equation that could be used to evaluate the level of investment
that a company should invest in information security. The three main parameters "the loss
conditioned as a breach occurring, the probability of a threat occurring and the vulnerability,
probability that that a threat would be successful". By not taking into account the monetary loss,
this model does not serve as a good tool for quantifying the security risk to companies.
3.3 Risk Assessment
Risk is commonly defined as a measure of probability and severity of adverse effects (Lowrance
1976). Quantitative risk analysis usually relies on probability and statistics derived from
"historical data, statistical analysis, and/or systemic observations and experimentation" Yacov
(1998). Probabilities determined by these methods are referred to as objective probabilities. In
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cases where there is little historical data and experimentation is impractical, one can rely on
subjective probabilities. Information security incidents are outcomes that are best described by
subjective probabilities. There is very little historical data and no way to experiment on a live
system in a way to generate a probability.
The ultimate purpose of any risk analysis and the resulting decision making process should be to
answer the fundamental question posed by Lowrance: "Who should decide on acceptability of
what risks, for whom, in what terms and why?" (1976) The impact of information security
incidents can be a denial of service that makes it difficult for trading partners to interact or an
information disclosure or integrity issue which may cause a loss in confidence of trading
partners. Since these incidents may impact supply chain partners, the question of acceptability of
risk of incurring these impacts should be discussed not only within the information security
department, but also considered by those with responsibility for supply chain relationships that
may be impacted by an incident.
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4 Information Security Risk
4.1 Detailed Description of Information Security
Classification
It is important to define a set of terms and a framework to discuss information security. One way
of looking at information security is to think about events which security devices can record in
the form of alerts and logs. A series of events and their surrounding context compose an attack.
An attack or series of attacks that are initiated for a reason are an incident. When considering an
incident, the analysis moves beyond the what, where and how of the attack to concentrating on
who performed the attack and the motivation (why) for initiating the attack. This classification
schema is illustrated in the diagram below:
Figure 2: Sandia Computer and Network Incident Taxonomy
Incident
Attack(s)
Event
Tool Vulnerability Action - Target Result
Source: Howard and Longstaff, 1998
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4.2 Events
Considering an incident is made up of events, which are composed of an attack or multiple
attacks, one can understand an incident by examining its most basic unit, the event. An event can
be defined as an action taken to access a target, which results in a change of the state or status of
the system or device being targeted. An example of an event would be the action of a scan being
run against a network, the target. Another example would be the action of authentication being
performed on an account, the target. When looking at events, we can classify all of them as being
composed of one of the following actions: probe, scan, flood, authenticate, bypass, spoof, read,
copy, steal, modify or delete. These actions can be authorized or unauthorized, which is defined
by being approved or unapproved by the owner or administrator of the target. The targets for the
actions can be one of the following: an account, process, data, component, computer, network or
internetwork. Not all combinations of actions and targets are possible or even likely. The
diagram below indicates the most common combinations.
Figure 3: Event Scenarios - Logical action and target combinations
Event
Action Target
Probe Account
Authenticat Component
InternetworkRead
Copy
Source: Modified from Howard and Longstaff, 1998
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Most events that occur on computers and networks are routine and of no interest in the context of
security analysis. An authorized user that authenticates their account is an event which would not
be of interest. Thousands of these events occur every day; the identification of events that are
unauthorized and outside of normal operations is the reason that security devices such as
Intrusion Detection Sensors (IDS) and Firewalls are deployed on networks. An event becomes
of interest to a security professional when it constitutes or is part of an attack. We will use IDS
generated events as an indicator of the probability of an attack being carried out later in the paper.
4.3 Attacks
An attack is executed by the assembly of a series of steps by an attacker in order to realize an
unauthorized result. In the framework proposed by Sandia (Howard and Longstaff, 1998),
attacks are characterized by the logical steps that an attacker assembles. According to the
framework, the attacker uses a tool to exploit a vulnerability. The tool creates an action against a
target resulting in an unauthorized result. An attacker uses any of the following types of tools:
physical attack, an information exchange, user command, script or program, autonomous agent,
toolkit, a distributed tool or a data tap.
Vulnerabilities are "a weakness in a system that allows unauthorized action"(Howard and
Longstaff, 1998). According to Sandia's taxonomy, vulnerabilities can be divided into three
categories. Design vulnerabilities are those which are the result of errors in the design or
specification of hardware or software, which makes a target susceptible to attack. No amount of
care taken during the installation or implementation will prevent a design vulnerability.
Vulnerabilities that result from improper implementation of hardware or software are described
as implementation vulnerabilities. An error in the configuration, such as having a system account
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with a default password, is defined as a configuration vulnerability (Howard and Longstaff,
1998).
A successful attack is characterized by the attacker's steps, including the use of a tool to exploit a
vulnerability in order to perform an action on a target, resulting in an unauthorized result.
Unauthorized results include an increase in accessibility, a loss of confidentiality, a loss of
information integrity, a denial of service and the theft of resources. An increased accessibility
means that an attacker has increased his level of access to an unauthorized level on a computer or
network. The loss of confidentiality and information integrity involves the distribution of
information to any party not authorized and the corruption of data on a computer or network. A
denial of service is characterized by the "intentional degradation or blocking of computer or
network resources". A theft of resources is the unauthorized use of resources such as bandwidth
on a network.
4.4 Incidents
An incident is the context around an attack that allows it to be grouped with other attacks based
on the attacks being performed, their objectives, the sites or the timing are referred to as an
incident. An incident can be characterized by the type of attacker and the objective. The type of
attacker is an important part of determining the attacker's motivation and his subsequent
objective. Within the Sandia taxonomy, types of attackers are identified as hackers, spies,
terrorists, corporate raiders, professional criminals, vandals and voyeurs. Like there being some
logical and illogical combinations of actions and events, similar relationships can be drawn
between the type of attacker and their objective. For example, a professional criminal's primary
objective will be financial gain, whereas a vandal will seek to achieve a challenge, status and
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thrill and to create damage. The most common relationships between an attacker and the
objective are shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Attacker and Objectives Relationship
Incident
A kr- Obiecties
4 iers S atud Thrill
Political Gains
Financial
Corporate Gains
ProfesionalDamage
Criminals
Vandals
Voyeurs
Source: Modified from Howard and Longstaff, 1998
4.5 Examples of Adverse Effects of Unauthorized
Results to a Supply Chain
4.5.1 Disclosure of Information
After virus infections and employee abuse of Internet access, unauthorized disclosure of
information incidents were the third most common information security incidents experienced by
firms responding to the 2004 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, with 59% of firms
surveyed reporting these types of attacks (Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, Richardson, 2004). The
impact of the disclosure of information to members of a supply chain can be grouped into two
categories, disclosure of a partner's information and disclosure of internally sensitive
information. An obvious example of an information disclosure incident is the disclosure of
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client's credit card numbers. The consequences of such a disclosure would be the loss of
customer trust and an avoidance of doing business in the future.
In the context of a business to business relationship, an information disclosure incident that
would have an impact on the supply chain would be the disclosure of client pricing information.
The disclosure of this sensitive client information could lead clients to lose confidence in their
supplier and potentially end a relationship. The pricing visibility could also result in increased
pricing pressure on the supplier leading to lower margins for the business.
4.5.2 Corruption of Information
An information security breach that resulted in the corruption of information could be particularly
damaging to a company's relationships with supply chain partners and result in additional costs
due to correcting errors resulting from the incident. An information security breach that resulted
in the corruption of order data could lead to orders being improperly fulfilled, delivered or billed.
One can imagine the impact of a truckload of a critical raw material being shipped to another
location. Not only would the cost of reshipping the material be an issue, but the potential
consumer of the raw material could experience operational issues as a result not receiving the
shipment. If an information security incident at the supplier resulted in the corruption of order
information, the supplier would bear additional costs to correct it and possibly face liability under
contracts with their customers.
4.5.3 Denial of Service
A denial of service that would have an impact on the supply chain operations of a firm would be
the loss of a system critical to supply chain activities. The inability to access a warehouse
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management application would lead to the inability of a distributor to store and ship items. The
delay of shipments to customers could result in additional costs for the expedited shipments of
product or the loss of customers due to missed delivery dates. With 17% of firms that
participated in the CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey reporting successful denial of
service attacks, protecting against such an attack on systems critical to the sourcing, production
planning, handling, order management and shipment of products should be considered important
especially by those companies that consider the supply chain a competitive advantage. (Gordon,
et al., 2004)
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5 Methodology
The premise of this analysis is that a system is composed of assets. By examining the risk of
information security breaches to each asset within a system, the overall risk of the system can be
determined. The likelihood of an undesired outcome occurring to an asset can be modeled by
looking at the vulnerabilities related to that asset. The probability of an asset being compromised
can be estimated based on the availability and ease of performing the exploit, the frequency of the
relevant attacks being observed in a variety of systems, and the attractiveness of the target. This
probability of compromise is then combined with the possible loss or cost resulting from a
security breach to determine a risk value for the asset. Totaling the expected values of loss
assessed to the assets that comprise a system will give a risk value for each system. Using
expected value of loss and the company's security priorities, risk mitigation plans within the
resource constraints of the organization can be formulated.
5.1 Asset Identification
The first step in assessing a system's information security risk is identifying the assets that make
up that system. It is important to know the status of all assets and their location within the
network in order to begin to understand its criticality within the system. The complex nature of
networks, which typically increases with the size of the corporation, makes the task of tracking
assets that are deployed within a network non-trivial. The nature of the network is also not static
because assets are constantly being added and removed. The security status of an asset can also
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change, if a new vulnerability is released or if its location within the network is changed. In
order to track these changes, many companies use an asset management system that is updated by
regular network scans which will capture the true composition of assets in the network and
highlight any new vulnerabilities.
For the purposes of this study, three hypothetical systems have been proposed, 1.) a
manufacturer's order management system, 2.) a distributor's order management system and 3.) a
customer's system for accessing the Internet to place orders and communicating with partners
over email. These systems are very simple and do not reflect the impact that other assets within a
network could have on the order entry systems, but the basic process involved of considering
each asset or class of asset and determining the hardware, operating system, software packages
and any corresponding vulnerabilities are the same within a hypothetical network and an actual
operating network. The added complexity of an actual system would not only increase the work
required to perform the asset and vulnerability identification phase of the evaluation, but also add
another layer of complexity due to a greater number of possible interactions between assets.
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5.1.1 The Manufacturer's Order Management System
Internet
Router Router
Firewall Firewall
Load Balancer Load Balancer
Web Servers Web Servers
Application Server Application Server
rXML Server
Database Serve Database Server
Figure 5: Network Diagram - Manufacturer's Order Management System
In order to evaluate the possible risk to the system, one must start with an understanding of the
business processes that are supported and the data stored to support those processes. The
hypothetical system proposed is an order management system built with redundant devices. The
system is used by the manufacturer to transact annual revenues of $500 million. There are two
Oracle databases which stores the customer and order information from their five hundred
customers. Orders can be placed either through the web front end or via XML messaging which
has been introduced with 70% of customers. The main application functionality is password
protected.
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Data
5.1.2 The Distributor's Order Management System
Internet
Router
Firewall
Web Server
ition Server
base Server
Figure 6: Network Diagram - Distributor System
The hypothetical distributor's network does not have redundant systems making it immediately
simpler than the manufacturer's system. The system handles the $25 million dollars in revenue
that is annually transacted by the distributor. The distributor has three thousand customers that
are served primarily through the web front end of the order management system. The customer
data and corresponding order information is stored in a SQL database.
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5.1.3 The Customer's System for Trading Partner Communication
Internet
Firewall
PC File Server Email Server
Figure 7: Network Diagram - Customer System
The hypothetical customer system is the least complex of the three systems. It includes a
personal computer, a file server, router and a firewall. The customer uses the personal computers
in their network to communicate with their supplier. They do not have any sort of web presence
for communicating with customers. They do correspond with their 2500 customers via email to
receive orders and confirm shipments.
5.2 Vulnerability Assessment
The next step in the assessment is to identify the vulnerabilities within the system through a
combination of automated vulnerability scanning and manual penetration/vulnerability testing.
As discussed in Chapter 4, vulnerabilities are "a weakness in the system allowing unauthorized
action" (Howard and Longstaff, 1998). An automated vulnerability scan is a program that
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systematically scans remote networks to identify vulnerabilities. There are a number of open-
source and commercially available scanners including Nessus, nmap, ISS, CyberCop, Qualys and
Bindview.
External scanning programs are only able to identify vulnerabilities that are detectable from the
Internet. While this may seem sufficient, if there were to be an issue within the network such as
the failure of a firewall or an attack was launched internally, the vulnerabilities that were not
detected from an external scan would be accessible to an attacker, and thus need to be considered
as a possible risk. Internal scanning should be performed in order to compile a complete
inventory of the vulnerabilities within the system. In order to confirm vulnerabilities found via
the scans, a manual security assessment is often performed to eliminate false positives, better
identify possible attack vectors and carry out a detailed analysis of the vulnerabilities. Internal
scanning can also be used as a tool for asset identification. When assessing a system that
supports an e-commerce application such as those being described in the hypothetical
manufacturer and distributor systems, an application assessment should also be performed to
detect vulnerabilities, such as SQL injection, that may be present in a web-based application.
For the purpose of this study, vulnerabilities were assigned to appropriate assets within the
hypothetical systems. The vulnerabilities that were attributed to the assets are commonly found
network and application vulnerabilities. In order to focus the scope of the analysis, the
vulnerabilities selected were those that would result in one of three outcomes: denial of service,
loss of information integrity or information disclosure. In order to illustrate the impact of a
compromise of to all of the critical assets, vulnerabilities were attributed to each type of asset in
the hypothetical systems.
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5.2.1 Probability of an Unauthorized Result
One of the challenges in modeling the risk of an information security breach is that deriving
objective probabilities is difficult due to the lack of historical data and the impracticality of
generating experimental data. In order to determine a probability to use for the quantitative risk
assessment methodology described in this paper, each unauthorized result stemming from a
vulnerability was given a score based on four characteristics. The total score was then used to
determine the probability based on a linear relationship. The four characteristics that were scored
were the ease of the exploit, the availability of the exploit, attractiveness of the target and the
frequency of the attack Internet wide.
5.2.1.1 Ease of Exploit
An ease of exploit rating was assigned to each vulnerability based on the skill level an attacker
must possess in order to perform the exploit. By rating the level of modification that would be
required to use a tool or commonly known exploit method, one can get a measure of the skill
level required to be successful in performing the attack. Further, the level of skill required gives
an indication of the size of the pool of possible attackers. If there is no exploit available, the skill
level required would be very high. This would make the size of the pool of potential attackers
small and thus the likelihood that the attack would be successful low. An existing tool that does
not require any modification would require a relatively low skill level. The lower skill level
implies that there is a larger pool of individuals that could perform the attack and achieve the
unauthorized result, and therefore the probability of a successful attack is high.
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Table 2: Ease of Use Scorin Model
5 No Modification Needed
4 Some Modification Needed,
Information Available
3 Some Modification Needed,
Information Unpublished
2 Exploit Exists but Unpublished
1 Exploit Not Available
5.2.1.2 Availability of Exploit
The availability of the exploit rating is applied in order to give an indication as to whether the
exploit is widely available or not. Again, the more widely an exploit has been published the
more likely the vulnerability will be attacked.
Table 3: Availability of Exploit Scoring
5 Google Searchable
3 Published on Semi-Private Lists
1 Available only on Private Lists
0 No Known Exploit
5.2.1.3 Attractiveness of the Target
When considering the attractiveness of the target, the perceived value of target was considered
with respect to unauthorized result that an attack would achieve. Any evaluation of the perceived
value must be somewhat subjective. By not basing the score solely on the target and including
the possible outcome achieved by an attacker, there was an ability to be more specific in the
scoring. For example, one might consider a router to be a less attractive target than a web server,
because of its perceived criticality within a system. If the vulnerability that has been associated
with the router allows an attacker to reroute incoming web traffic to a web site not managed by
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the company that owns the system, it might be considered to be a very attractive target. The
unauthorized result of such an attack could result in not only a denial of service to the company's
system, but the possibility of customers being routed to a web site that could provide the attacker
with a large financial gain or increase in status.
In order to understand the attractiveness of a target, the analysis must extend beyond the attack to
the incident. When considering an incident, the context of an attack is considered including the
type of attacker and the attacker's objective. As discussed in Chapter 4, Sandia has seven classes
of attackers: hackers, spies, terrorists, corporate raiders, professional criminals, vandals and
voyeurs (Howard and Longstaff, 1998). The relationships between attackers and their objectives
are shown here again, as in Figure 4 in Section 4.4.
Figure 8: Attacker and Objectives Relationship
Incident
Attacker Objectives
Hackers Challenge,
Se: MStatus, Thrill
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Gains
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Raiders Da ag
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Criminals
Vandals
Voyeurs
Source: Modified from Howard and Longstaff, 1998
In order to assess the attractiveness of a target, the first step is to determine the set of attackers
that would be interested in the system in question. In the case of all of the hypothetical networks
in this study, the attackers considered are hackers, professional criminals, vandals and voyeurs.
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Spies and terrorists were eliminated from the analysis due to the lack of a political gain from a
compromise of one of the systems being studied. There may be instances where a corporation
would be the target for these types of attackers, but in this case the product being traded would
not be of interest to such a group. A vulnerability and its corresponding unauthorized result is
looked at from the perspective of each type of attacker and the level to which it satisfies his/her
objective.
The two main attacker objectives that are relevant to most e-commerce enabled systems are
"challenge, status and thrill" and "financial gain". When considering "financial gain", not only is
the direct financial gain such as the transferring of funds relevant, but also the potential for
financial gain through obtaining sensitive information, such as credit card numbers, which could
be illegally used or sold. While the actual value of a financial gain can be roughly calculated,
the "challenge, status and thrill" objective is very subjective. Two factors that can be considered
to rate the attractiveness in terms of the "challenge, status and thrill" objective are the visibility of
the unauthorized result and the profile of the company being attacked. The defacement of a web
site is a very visible, thus it is fairly attractive to attack. If the web-site is the home page of a
Fortune 500 company, it would be rated highly attractive. If it were the website of a small local
paper distributor, it would be rated as medium or low attractiveness. The scale and
corresponding attractiveness ratings are in Table 4 below.
5 High Impact
3 Medium Impact
1 Low Impact
0 No Impact
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5.2.1.4 Frequency of Attack
The final rating applied to a vulnerability was the frequency of this attack occurring Internet
wide. The method used for determining this relative frequency was through analyzing Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) event logs collected from a set of 364 devices that provide representative
sample of IDS devices being monitored by an independent security services firm. The IDS
devices are part of the security infrastructure of a variety of Fortune 500 companies including
automotive, financial services, media and retail companies. These devices were located both at
the perimeter and in internal segments of the corporation's networks. The assumption being
made is that these 364 sensors that are placed in a variety of environments throughout the world
represent a good sample of the types of attacks occurring Internet wide.
Events from the 364 IDS sensors were gathered over a 31 day period from 24 February 2005
until 26 March 2005. The time frame of 31 days was selected in an attempt to go through a full
monthly cycle of network activity, while keeping the amount of data manageable. During the 31
day period there were 115,655,000 events collected by all of the sensors. These events
represented 3354 different attacks as detected by IDS signatures. The top 135 attacks
represented 95% of the over all event volume.
In order to score the vulnerabilities that are being considered, a search of the event database is
performed to determine if an event indicating an attack directed at that vulnerability is present. If
an event that indicates this attack has been performed is found in the database, it is scored based
on whether it is seen in the top 95% of events or not. If it is in the top 95%, it is rated as a "2".
If it is not in the top 95%, it is rated as a "1". If it is not found, then it is rated as "0". If an
analysis were being performed on a real system that has an IDS installation, a high score of "5"
would be assigned if the attack was detected within the network.
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Table 5: Frequency of Attack Internet Wide
5 Event Seen in Target Network
3 Event seen and subject of
Internet wide alert
2 Event in top 95% of Attacks
1 Event seen in bottom 5% of
attacks
o Event not seen
5.2.1.5 Probability Relationship to Outcome Score
In order to arrive at a probability of the vulnerability being exploited, the score from each of the
four vulnerability characteristics, ease of use, availability, attractiveness of target and frequency,
are totaled to determine the Vulnerability Base Score.
Equation 1: Vulnerability Base Score
E = {1,2,3,4,5 }
AV,= {0,1,3,5 }
A, ={0,1,3,5 }
F ={0,1,2,3,4,5 }
V = E + A, + A, + F
Where V is Vulnerability Base Score, E is Ease of Use, Av is Availability, At is Attractiveness,
and F is Frequency.
The possible Vulnerability Base Scores were then assigned a probability based on a linear
relationship, where the minimum possible score of 1 was assigned a probability of 0.05 and the
maximum possible score of 20 was assigned a probability of 1.0.
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Figure 9: Base Score and Corresponding Probability
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5.2.2 Unauthorized Results Considered
In order to focus the scope of this model, the analysis was limited to evaluating the impact of
three unauthorized results. If we refer back to the Sandia Model described in Chapter 4, there are
five unauthorized results described in the security incident classification (Howard and Longstaff,
1998). By focusing on attacks that result in disclosure of information, corruption of information
and denial of service, the analysis was narrowed to the results that would have the greatest impact
on a supply chain, as the examples in Chapter 4 indicate. The two results not considered in this
model were increased access and a theft of resources. The method for adding these two
additional results to the model would not be difficult. The probability calculation would be the
same and evaluating the impact of increased access of the additional results would simply be an
extension of the logic used for the unauthorized results in this analysis.
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5.3 Quantifying Impact on an Asset of an
Unauthorized Result
In order to perform a quantitative risk assessment, there must be a probability of an outcome and
a value of that outcome occurring. In this method, the value of the outcome occurring was
determined by looking at each target and determining what the cost to the business would be for
each of the unauthorized results being considered. In order to determine these losses or costs, the
business process being supported, the impact on partnerships and any regulatory costs resulting
from the unauthorized results were considered. By considering how the three possible
unauthorized result scenarios, denial of service, loss of information integrity and loss of
information confidentiality directed toward each asset would impact the business financially, the
values of the consequences were determined. It may be that some scenarios cannot logically be
applied to an asset. For example the compromise of a load balancer would not on its own be
responsible for a loss of information integrity. In this case, the calculation of the cost of such an
action would obviously not be addressed.
The costs or losses stemming from each unauthorized result to the hypothetical systems
considered are explained using a database server from the manufacturer's system as an example.
These costs should be used as a guideline. However, companies engaged in a risk assessment
may identify additional costs and decide that some of those listed are not relevant. The process
of determining the relevant costs is one that should be specified by each business undertaking a
risk assessment.
When considering the value of the loss resulting from a denial of service, the criticality of the
asset to the continued operation of the complete system is necessary in order to understand its
impact on the business processes being performed on the system. Once that is determined, the
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costs that would be incurred due to the loss of availability and the resulting system-wide impact
can be assessed. In the case of a denial of service, we determine if the denial of service will
result in a loss of the entire system availability or have a more isolated impact.
5.3.1 Costs Related to a Loss in Availability
When considering the database servers in the manufacturer's system, it was first determined that
a loss of availability of both databases would result in the system not being able to function. The
opportunity cost associated with unavailability impact would be the amount of revenue lost from
the orders expected to transact during the outage that would not be transacted at a later point.
The amount of revenue expected to be transacted is arrived at by calculating the average
transactions over a time period multiplied by the length of time the system is predicted to be
unavailable due to the outage. After calculating the value of the expected transactions, the
percentage of those transactions that would not be recaptured once the system was again
operational is estimated. This estimate of the probability is based on the strength of relationships
with customers and the difficulty a customer would have switching suppliers. Since the
manufacturer has a relatively small number of customers with a high average value of the order,
one would assume that the majority of orders would be attempted again once the system was
operational, so a small percentage is estimated.
5.3.2 Costs Related to a Loss of Information Integrity
When considering a loss of information integrity, the losses that were considered are the cost of
customers lost due to a loss in confidence, regulatory penalty costs, and the estimated labor cost
for restoring information integrity. By calculating the annual revenue derived from each
customer and determining the portion of the total customers that would lose confidence in the
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company due to a loss of information integrity, the value of lost customers can be found.
Generally a larger company with an established reputation would be expected to lose a smaller
percentage of customers. However, if there is a potential for the disclosure of highly sensitive
material, the percentage might be large even if the company has an established reputation due to
the customer base having a higher sensitivity to this type of breach.
The regulatory penalty that could be levied if information which was altered impacts the
company's ability to accurately record financial results, should be provided by the accounting
department within an organization. For the purposes of this study, a regulatory penalty of $1
million dollars was used when considering a loss of information integrity incident involving the
hypothetical manufacturer's database.
The labor costs of repairing the system is a fairly straightforward calculation. In the case of
repairing a database, one would determine the average hourly rate for a database administrator
and then multiply it by the number of hours estimated to be necessary to repair a major
information integrity incident. The estimate for the amount of time can be based on the number
of records in a database.
5.3.3 Costs Related to a Loss of Information Confidentiality
The outcome from a loss of information confidentiality was determined to be customer defection.
The cost of the defection of a customer was arrived at in the same way as the calculation for cost
of a customer resulting from an information integrity issue. An assumption was made in the case
of the hypothetical manufacturer that the number of customers lost based on an information
disclosure would be less than the number of customers lost due to an information integrity issue.
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In Appendix A, a sample calculation of the losses and costs resulting from the unauthorized
results described above are displayed for the database in the hypothetical manufacturer's system.
5.3.4 Alternative Method for Calculating Consequences
As discussed in the literature review, Garg et al (2003) studied the impact that an information
security breach had on a company's stock market price. If we assume that a drop in stock price is
actually representative of the value lost to the company, the Garg et al article (2003) might
provide values for the expected consequence in the absence of analysis of the individual company
situation. By finding the stock price impact for a similar type of company in the study, a
company could use the percentage drop in stock price and corresponding loss of value to the
company as the consequence value.
5.4 Expected Value of Loss Calculation
The methodology to this point has been aimed at identifying all the assets in a system, identifying
any vulnerabilities associated with those assets, attributing a probability of exploit to each
vulnerability and calculating the monetary impact of an unauthorized result. In order to quantify
the risk of a security breach, the variables that were derived through the methodology explained
above are used to quantify the risk to the asset, the system and the supply chain.
Equation 2: Expected Value of Loss Calculation
k 
VE(Aj]= XP(V C
i=1
N
EISC,]= ZS,i=1
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Where Ai is an Asset, P(Vij) is the Probability of a Vulnerability, Cij is the Consequence of the
Vulnerability, Si = is a System, and SCi is a Supply Chain
In order to provide to provide a unit-less classification of the expected value of loss, each
vulnerability was classified as "A", "B", "C" or "D" based on the percentage of annual revenue
that the vulnerability's expected value of loss represented. The table below specifies the ranges
for each classification.
Table 6: Classification of Expected Value of Loss as a Percentage of Annual Revenue
of Anna Ree.
A Greater than 10%
B Greater than 5%
C Greater than 0.05%
D Less than 0.05%
5.5 Risk Mitigation Plan
A risk mitigation plan is developed by considering the risk value for an asset, the cost of reducing
the risk and the priorities of the company. In order to understand how a company's priorities
could shift the prioritization of security projects, four risk mitigation plans based on different
corporate goals were assembled for each hypothetical system. The first goal considered was to
minimize expected value of loss. The other plans considered focused on the scenario of a
company having no tolerance for one unauthorized result. All of these plans were subject to a
budgetary and human resource constraint.
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The cost to mitigate each vulnerability was determined by assessing the number of hours required
to fix the system, the cost of the labor required for the work and any capital expenditure that
needed to be made. For example, a software upgrade may be required in order to mitigate a
vulnerability. In order to perform an upgrade, the system will need to be backed up and then the
upgrade performed. The amount of time to perform and upgrade was estimated to be 16 hours,
not necessarily performed consecutively. Based on an estimate of the loaded cost of for an
employee to perform this task, an hourly rate of $100 was used to perform the calculation.
Therefore an upgrade would cost $1600.
In this study, the information security budgets for each hypothetical organization based on
spending benchmarks. According to the 2004 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, the
average percentage of a firm's information technology budget that is spent on information
security is between 1-2% (Gordon, Martin, Lucyshyn and Richardson, 2004). According to Weil
and Broadbent (1998), manufacturing organizations, like the hypothetical manufacturer in this
study, allocate an average 3.4% of their annual revenues to information technology budgets.
Organizations in the wholesale and retail sector spend less on information technology.
"Wholesalers" and "retailers" spend an average of 2.5% of annual revenues on information
technology (Broadbent and Weil, 1998). If this study were being performed for an actual
organization, this figure would simply be the budget allocated by the organization for information
security.
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6 Sample Risk Assessment
In this section, the results from the phases of the risk assessment on the three hypothetical
systems, manufacturer's order entry system, distributor's order entry system, and customer
network will be discussed and displayed as it would be in a report detailing the risk assessment.
6.1 Asset Identification
Lists of each asset that is deployed within the three systems were compiled based on the sample
network diagrams.
Table 7: Asset Inventory List for the Three Systems
DIS DB1 I DlISDBR1 Microsoft SQL Server 2000s r ur
Distributor DIS WebServer WS1 DISWS1 Apache 2.0.35
Sun Microsystems Java System Application
Distributor DIS Application Server APS1 DISAPS1 Server 7 Platform Edition Update 4
Distributor DIS Firewall FW1 DISFW1 CheckPoint Firewall -1
Distributor DIS Firewall FW1 DISFWI CheckPoint Firewall -1
Distributor DIS Router RT1 DISRT1 D-Link Router
Manufacturer MFR Database DB1 MFRDB1 Oracle
Manufacturer MFR Database DB2 MFRDB2 Oracle
Manufacturer MFR WebServer WS1 MFRWS1 Appache 2.0.45
Manufacturer MFR WebServer WS2 MFRWS2 Appache 2.0.45
Manufacturer MFR WebServer WS3 MFRWS3 Appache 2.0.45
Manufacturer MFR WebServer WS4 MFRWS4 Appache 2.0.45
Manufacturer MFR Router RTI MFRRT1 Cisco 7206VXR Router
Manufacturer MFR Router RT2 MFRRT2 Cisco 7206VXR RouterSun Microsystems Java System Application
Manufacturer MFR Application Server APS1 MFRAPS1 Server 7 Platform Edition Update 4
Sun Microsystems Java System Application
Manufacturer MFR Application Server APS2 MFRAPS2 Server 7 Platform Edition Update 4
Manufacturer MFR Load Balancer LB1 MFRLB1 Zeus Load Balancer
Manufacturer MFR Load Balancer LB2 MFRLB2 Zeus Load Balancer
Manufacturer MFR Firewall FW1 MFRFW1 Cisco PIX 535
Manufacturer MFR Firewall FW2 MFRFW2 Cisco PIX 535
Customer CUS File Server FS1 CUSFS1 Windows NT
Customer CUS Email Server ES1 CUSES1 Windows 2003/Exchange Server
Customer CUS Firewall FW1 CUSFW1 Cisco Pix 501Windows 2003/MSFT Office/Yahoo Instant
Customer CUS PC PC1 CUSPC1 Messenger
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6.2 Vulnerability Assessment
The vulnerabilities that were used to evaluate the three systems were based on common
vulnerabilities found in the Open Source Vulnerabilities Database (OSVDB, 2005), Sans Top 20
List (SANS, 2005), and Hacking Exposed for Applications (Scambray and Shema, 2002). The
assets with an associated vulnerability are listed with a title, description, the generic unauthorized
result description, brief mitigation description and a reference. There were eight vulnerabilities
identified that affected twenty-one of the assets within the systems. A table including the
reference URL for each vulnerability can be found in Appendix B.
Table 8: Manufacturer System Vulnerabilities Identified
M.FR WS1 Annache 2045 Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing DoS
IPv6 URI parsing routines in the apr-util library for Apache
HTTP Server and IBM HTTP Server contains a flaw that may
allow a remote denial of service 1OSVDB/ID: 9994
IPv6 URI parsing routines in the apr-util library for Apache
HTTP Server and IBM HTTP Server contains a flaw that may
MFRWS2 Appache 2.0.45 Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing DoS allow a remote denial of service OSVDB/ID: 9994
IPv6 URI parsing routines in the apr-util library for Apache
HTTP Server and IBM HTTP Server contains a flaw that may
MFRWS3 Appache 2.0.45 Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing DoS allow a remote denial of service OSVDB/ID: 9994
IPv6 URI parsing routines in the apr-util library for Apache
HTTP Server and IBM HTTP Server contains a flaw that may
MFRWS4 Appache 2.0.45 Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing DoS allow a remote denial of service OSVDB/ID: 9994
TCP stack implementation of numerous vendors contains a
MFRRT1 Cisco 7206VXR Router Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing DoS flaw that may allow a remote denial of service OSVDB/ID: 4030
TCP stack implementation of numerous vendors contains a
MFRRT2 Cisco 7206VXR Router Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing DoS flaw that may allow a remote denial of service OSVDB/ID: 4030
Sun Microsystems Java Sun Java System Web / Application
System Application Server 7 Server Malformed Client Certificate The issue is triggered by the use of malformed client
MFRAPS1 Platform Edition Update 4 DoS certificates, and will result in loss of availability for the server. OSVDB/ID: 11383
Sun Microsystems Java Sun Java System Web / Application
System Application Server 7 Server Malformed Client Certificate The issue is triggered by the use of malformed client
MFRAPS2 Platform Edition Update 4 DoS certificates, and will result in loss of availability for the server. OSVDB/ID: 11383
Triggered due to the handling of ICMP error messages and
ICMP Implementation Malformed Path when the "Path MTU Discovery" (PMTUD) mechanism is
MFRFW1 Cisco PIX 535 MTU DoS used OSVDB/ID: 15619
Triggered due to the handling of ICMP error messages and
ICMP Implementation Malformed Path when the "Path MTU Discovery" (PMTUD) mechanism is
MFRFW2 Cisco PIX 535 MTU DoS used OSVDB/ID: 15619
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Table 9: Distributor System Vulnerabilities Identified
Mirosnoft SQL Se~vr 20 Cross Site Scriptina
Malicious code inserted due to lack of validation parameters
leading making it possible for user's to see each others
accounts. Hacking Exposed
IPv6 URI parsing routines in the apr-util library for Apache
HTTP Server and IBM HTTP Server contains a flaw that may
DISWS1 Apache 2.0.35 Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing DoS allow a remote denial of service OSVDB/ID: 9994
Sun Microsystems Java Sun Java System Web / Application
System Application Server 7 Server Malformed Client Certificate The issue is triggered by the use of malformed client
DISAPS1I Platform Edition Update 4 DoS certificates, and will result in loss of availability for the server. OSVDB/ID: 11383
DISFW1 CheckPoint Firewall -1 HTTP Server Format String Check Point FireWall-1 HTTP Server Format String OSVDB/ID: 4414
DISFW1 CheckPoint Firewall -1 HTTP Server Format String Check Point FireWall-1 HTTP Server Format String OSVDB/ID: 4414
D-Link Router DHCP Request Flood
DISRT1 D-Link Router DoS D-Link Router DHCP Request Flood DoS OSVDB/ID: 7287
Table 10: Customer System Vulnerabilities Identified
Triggered due to the handling of ICMP error messages and
Windows 2003/Exchange ICMP Implementation Malformed Path when the "Path MTU Discovery" (PMTUD) mechanism is
CUSESi Server MTU DoS used OSVDB/ID: 15619
Triggered due to the handling of ICMP error messages and
ICMP Implementation Malformed Path when the "Path MTU Discovery" (PMTUD) mechanism is
CUSFW1 Cisco Pix 501 MTU DoS used OSVDB/ID: 15619
Windows 2003/MSFT
Office/Yahoo Instant SANS 20 and
CUSPC1 Messenger Buffer Overflow Old version of Yahoo Messenger Bugtraq/ID 9145
6.3 Quantifying the Impact on Asset of Unauthorized
Result
In order to examine the possible impacts of the unauthorized results on each asset, a result tree
for each asset was developed. The results trees were developed based on estimates of the
reaction of customers to the event, corporate responses to events, and regulatory fines levied.
The possible reactions of customers that were considered were a decision to choose another
supplier in the short term and the decision to discontinue the relationship entirely.
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6.3.1 Manufacturer System Outcomes
Figure 10: Manufacturer's System Outcomes from Undesired Results
LA L-of to of Etxpecw-tors Dodgoto"
Loss of
Availability
Loss of
Information Integrity c
In the case of the manufacturer's system, it was determined that a loss of availability which made
the order entry system inaccessible would result in 10% of the orders that should have placed
during that time frame not being placed. The scenario that is assumed is that 10% of distributors
that have difficulty placing their order through the system due to the outage, will choose to move
that order to another supplier. In the case of the manufacturer, where they have relatively few
customers, a relatively strong partner relationship is expected, and thus there is not expectation
that the loss of availability will not lead to a long term customer loss. The cost of losing 10% of
the orders for the affected time period was simply calculated based on the value of 10% of the
order revenue that would be placed during a one day time period.
For the purpose of this analysis, a one day loss of availability was used. If it was perceived that
due to the skills internal to the organization or severity of a possible attack the organization
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would take longer to recover, the time period could be extended and the calculation could be
easily adjusted.
In the event of the manufacturer disclosing confidential data, it is perceived that 5% of the
manufacturer's customers will lose confidence in the manufacturer and terminate their
relationship. For this assessment, it has been determined that the loss of information integrity
would result in more than just a loss of manufacturer customers. In the case of the manufacturer,
an information integrity issue would result not only in a higher percentage, 10%, of customers
terminating their relationship with the business, but there would also be regulatory and labor
costs to consider..
In the event of a loss of information integrity, there would need to be the involvement of a
database administrator or other skilled resource to try and restore the effected data. The hourly
wage of a database administrator was estimated at $150. In addition, if there is difficulty
restoring data completely, it may be prevent the firm from being able to accurately report their
financial standing. In the case of the manufacturer, the potential fine from a violation of the
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 due to a misreporting of results was estimated at $1,000,000 per
incident (Gegten, 2005).
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6.3.2 Distributor System Outcomes
Figure 11: Distributor's System Outcomes from Undesired Results
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It can be noted that in the case of the distributor, the outcomes from each unauthorized results are
more severe in terms of higher percentages of customers lost due information disclosure and
integrity issues, and a higher percentage of orders that are switched to another supplier after a
loss of availability. The logic applied is that the relationships with customers will not be as
strong as there is a much larger customer base, and that the reputation of the company will be
more easily damaged due to them being smaller and potentially perceived as less established.
In the event of a loss of availability of their systems, there is an expectation that 20% of the
expected orders for that period of time will be switched to a competitor. In contrast to the
manufacturer, the distributor in this case has a policy of giving a 20% discount on all orders
incorrectly processed due to distributor error. In order to account for this in the model, the
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outcomes from the loss of information integrity event are a loss of 30% of the customer base and
a 20% discount to all orders that are affected. In this model, we used the assumption that only
orders that were placed during the one day effected period were subject to this charge, but if other
assumptions were made, such as the database corruption affecting more than just the orders
placed during the incident, the loss from this policy could potentially be much higher. In the
event of information disclosure, the assumption was that there would be a loss of 20% of the
customer base.
6.3.3 Customer System Outcomes
Figure 12: Customer's System Outcomes from Undesired Results
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The customer system was assessed to have a higher likelihood of customers switching to another
source of their product were there to be a loss of availability. Instead of the 10% and 20% loss as
seen in the manufacturer and distributor respectively, the customer would be expected to lose
50% of expected orders. In the case of a loss of information integrity the customer is expected to
only lose 20% of their customer base, due to their average order size being small enough that
their customer's perception of risk related to continuing to work with them would be relatively
51
small. In the case of information disclosure, the loss was estimated to be 10% of the customer
base.
6.3.4 Risk Rating - Calculation of the Expected Loss
Once the outcomes for the three unauthorized results were determined, they were then mapped to
the vulnerabilities that had been associated with each asset. Then the probability of the attack
occurring were multiplied with the consequence to arrive at the expected value of the loss. A
unit-less classification of the expected value of loss values was assigned in order to give
reference to the severity of the expected loss in relation to the company's annual revenue. Each
expected value of loss was assigned a letter, "A", "B", "C" or "D" based on the percentage of
annual revenue. Table 11 defines the ranges for each classification. It is followed by Table 12
which displays the assets, with corresponding expected values of the loss and a classification of
the value in terms of its percentage of annual revenue for each system.
Table 11 : Classification of Expected Value of Loss as a Percentage of Annual Revenue
A Greater than 10%
B Greater than 5%
C Greater than 0.05%
D Less than 0.05%
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Table 12: Vulnerabilities and Corresponding Expected Value of Loss
DB1 Cross Site Scripting Information Disclosur 0.6 3000000 A
WS1 Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing DoS Loss of Availability 0.5 10000 D
Sun Java System Web / Application Server
APSI Malformed Client Certificate DoS Loss of Availability 0.65 13000 D
FW1 HTTP Server Format String Information Integrity 0.5 3820000 A
FW1 HTTP Server Format String Loss of Availability 0.5 10000 D
RT1 D-Link Router DHCP Request Flood DoS Loss of Availability 0.55 11000 D
DB1 SQL Injection Information Integrity 0.5 25560000 B
DB2 SQL Injection Information Integrity 0.5 25560000 B
WS1 Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing DoS Loss of Availability 0.5 25000 D
WS2 Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing DoS Loss of Availability 0.5 25000 D
WS3 Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing DoS Loss of Availability 0.5 25000 D
WS4 Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing DoS Loss of Availability 0.5 25000 D
RT1 Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing DoS Loss of Availability 0.65 65000 D
RT2 Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing DoS Loss of Availability 0.65 65000 D
Sun Java System Web / Application Server
APS1 Malformed Client Certificate DoS Loss of Availability 0.65 65000 D
Sun Java System Web / Application Server
APS2 Malformed Client Certificate DoS Loss of Availability 0.65 65000 D
ICMP Implementation Malformed Path MTU
FW1 DoS Loss of Availability 0.8 80000 D
ICMP Implementation Malformed Path MTU
FW2 DoS Loss of Availability 0.8 80000 D
ICMP Implementation Malformed Path MTU
ES1 DoS Loss of Availability 0.8 19000 C
ICMP Implementation Malformed Path MTU
FW1 DoS _ Loss of Availability 0.8 19000 C
PC1 Buffer Overflow Information Integrity 0.25 150000 B
Table 13: Comparison of Percentage Annual Revenue at Risk Across the Three Systems
System Impact Comparison
0.3
0.25
0.2
2 0.15
0.1
0.05
0
CUS DIS MFR
System
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As can be seen in Table 13 above, in this model the distributor is at a much higher risk due to
security breaches than the manufacturer or the customers. This is due in part because of the
outcomes and consequences that were assessed to the system. As mentioned above, the rate of
partner defection was higher at the distributor than at the manufacturer and the customer. The
distributor was deemed to have less solid relationships with partners than the manufacturer, while
at the same time the distributor's order value is such that the perceived risk to a partner after an
incident would be high enough that the distributor would lose a greater percentage of its customer
base than expected within the customer business. The assumption in this study was that
redundancy does not reduce the overall expected loss security if the vulnerability exists on all
assets performing the same function. It does however reduce the specific asset's expected loss, as
the expected loss is divided between the two assets performing the same function. Redundancy
is important in protecting systems from downtime due to mechanical failure, but if two assets
have the same vulnerability and they are subject to an attack the assumption made in this study is
that both would be attacked in the same manner.
6.4 Risk Mitigation Plans
6.4.1 Scenarios
Risk mitigation plans for each company were developed based on four different scenarios,
minimizing expected loss value and then prioritizing each of the unauthorized results, loss of
availability, loss of information integrity, and information disclosure. The plans were also
compared to the information security budgets of each company as calculated based on benchmark
percentages of annual revenues.
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Table 14: Annual Security Budget Calculation
I $3.OOO.OOOI 2.5%1 $75,0001 2.0%1 $1,5001
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Icu
* Broadbent and Weil, 1998
** Gordon, et al., 2004
The cost to mitigate the risk presented by each vulnerability was estimated based on the time to
perform the action required, the cost of the labor and any capital investment required. The
following table shows this calculation for all of the systems.
Table 15: Manufacturer Cost to Perform Mitigating Action
Information
Manufacturer Database DB1 SQL Inection Par in tr 25560Ls Programmin 80 150 $12" $1 12000Information
Manufacturer Database DB2 SQL Inection Int ity 25560000 Prorammin 80 $150 $12000 $0 $12,000
Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing Loss of Upggrade
Manufacturer WebServer WS1 DoS Availability 25000 Software 16 $100 $1,600 $0 $1,600
Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing Loss of Upggrade
Manufacturer WebServer WS2 DoS Availability 25000 Software 16 $100 $1 600. $0 $1,600
Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing Loss of Upggrade
Manufacturer WebSeR er WS3 DoS Availability 25000 Software 16 $100 $1.600 $0 $1,600
Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing Loss of Upggrade
Manufacturer WebServer WS4 DoS Availabilit 25000 Software 16 $1001 $1,600 $ $1,600
Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing Loss of Apply Available
Manufacturer Router RT1 DoS Availability 65000 Patch 16 $100 $1,600 $0 $1,600
Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing Loss of Apply Available
Manufacturer Router RT2 DoS Availabilit 65000 Patch 16 t 00t 1600 $0 $1,600
Sun Java System Web /
Application Application Server Malformed Loss of Upgrade
Manufacturer Server APS1 Client Certificate DoS Availability 65000 Software 16 1001 $1.600 0 $1,600
Sun Java System Web /
Application Application Server Malformed Loss of Upgrade
Manufacturer Server APS2 Client Certificate DoS Availability 65000 Software 16 100 $1,600 $0 $1.600
ICMP Implementation Malformed Loss of Upgrade
Manufacturer Firewall FW1 Path MTU DoS Availabili 80000 Software 16 $100 $1,600 $0 $1,600
ICMP Implementation Malformed Loss o Upgrade
Manufacturer Firewall FW2 Path MTU DoS Availability 80000 Software 16 $100 $1,600 $0 $1,600
Table 16: Distributor Cost to Perform Mitigating Action
Information
Distributor Database DB1 Cross Site Scripting Disclosure 3000000 Programming 80 $150 $12,000 $0 $12.000
Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing Loss of Upggrade
Distributor WebServer WS1 DoS Availability 10000 Software 16 $100 $1,600 $0 $1,600
Sun Java System Web /
Application Application Server Malformed Loss of Upgrade
Distributor Server APS1 Client Certificate DoS Availability 13000 Software 16 $100 $1,600 $0 $1,600Information Apply Available
Distributor Firewall FW1 HTTP Server Format String Int ' 3820000 Patch 24 1001 $2.400 $ $2400Loss of Apply Available
Distributor Firewall FW1 HTTP Server Format String Availabili 10000 Patch 24 $100 $2,400 $0 $2,400D-Link Router DHCP Request Loss o
Distributor Router RT1 Flood DoS Availability 11000 Disable DHCP 4 $100 $400 $0 $400
Table 17: Customer Cost to Perform Mitigating Action
ICMP Implementation Malformed Loss of Upgrade
Customer Email Server ES1 Path MTU DOS Availabilide 19000 Software 16 $100 $1,600 $0 $1600ICMP Implementation Malformed Loss of Upgrade
Customer Firewall FW1 Path MTU DOS Availabil, 19000 Software 16 $100 $1,600 $ $1,600Information Upgrade
lCustomer IPC iPC1 Buffer Overflow integrity 150000 Software 21 $100,$0 $0, $2001
The following tables show the four mitigation plans for each system. The steps in the plan that
fall outside of the budget, as shown above are shaded in red. Projects that will need to be scaled
back to fall within budget are shaded pink.
6.4.2 Distributor Mitigation Plan
Table 18: Distributor Mitigation Plan with Budgetary Constraints
The distributor's information security budget is $12,500. With the expected loss stemming from
an event that causes either a loss of information integrity or information disclosure being so much
higher than a loss of availability event, it would seem that the company should begin by
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mitigating the firewall vulnerability. This vulnerability had a high expected loss because of the
high consequence of an information disclosure and a probability of exploit of 65%. The
relatively high probability was as a result of an exploit being available and a security device
being an attractive target, resulting in high scores for the ease of use, availability, and
attractiveness ratings. The Check Point Firewall-1 vulnerability allows a remote attacker to
execute arbitrary code, which essentially means that the attacker can run any command they
desire on the firewall (OSVDB, 2005). With administrative control of the firewall, the attacker
could perform a denial of service or corrupt data passing through the firewall. The mitigation of
the vulnerability can be performed by applying a patch provided by Check Point. The cost of
applying the patch used in the model is calculated by estimating that a system administrator
costing $100 would take 24 hours to test, implement, and document the patch release. The 56%
reduction in the expected value of loss and relatively low mitigation cost of $2400 make it a
logical first step in the mitigation plan.
The next project that the distributor should tackle, if the goal is minimizing expected value of
loss, is the SQL injection vulnerability causing cross-site scripting. Cross-site scripting
vulnerabilities are essentially an issue resulting from trusting foreign data. Through poor input
validation in the database, an attacker can insert malicious code in the form of SQL commands to
obtain other users data. The unauthorized outcome of information disclosure and the resulting
attractiveness of the target resulted in the second highest expected value of loss in the system.
Fixing this vulnerability is not as straightforward as applying a patch or upgrading an application.
In order to address this issue, a programmer will need to ensure that there is validation of data in
every place where the application accepts data. A programmer is a more expensive resource,
costing an estimated $150 per hour, and it was estimated that there would be 80 hours of work
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required to fix this problem. The resulting $12,000 mitigation cost will cause the distributor to be
over budget. It may be possible to work with a programmer to determine how much could be
accomplished and stay within the $10,100.
The remaining vulnerabilities in the system have the potential to cause a loss of availability and
have significantly lower vulnerabilities that are classified in the "D" category. The Apache web
server has a vulnerability which makes it possible for an attacker to formulate an attack using
URI requests that causes a loss of availability of the server due to a crash of the httpd child
process (OSVDB, 2005). This vulnerability can be fixed by upgrading the server to a later
version. The Sun Java System application server in the system is also susceptible to a remote
denial of service. This vulnerability is exploited through an attacker using malformed client
certificates and can be mitigated through upgrading to the latest version of the software. The
estimated of costs for upgrading each software package was based on an estimate 16 hours of
work performed by an system administrator at a cost of $100 per hour.
The D-Link router in the system also has a vulnerability that may allow an attacker to perform a
remote denial of service. By flooding the router with Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
(DHCP) packets, the attacker will cause the device to use all available memory, which will cause
it to reboot (OSVDB, 2005). The repeated rebooting makes the router suffer a loss of
availability. In the distributor network, where there is no DCHP server in use, this vulnerability
can be mitigated by disabling DHCP. This is a straightforward task that should not take more
than 4 hours of a system administrator's time, and thus costs $400 to fix.
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6.4.3 Manufacturer
Table 19: Manufacturer Mitigation Plan with Budgetary Constraints
Information
DB1 SQL Injection Integrity $25,560,000 49% B Programming $12,000 1 11 X I
Information
DB2 SQL Injection Integrity $25,560,000 49% B Programming $12,000 2 12 X 2
ICMP Implementation Malformed Loss of Upgrade
FW1 Path MTU DoS Availability $80,000 0% D Software $1,600 3 1 X 3
ICMP Implementation Malformed Loss of Upgrade
FW2 Path MTU DoS Availability 80000 0% D Software $1,600 4 2 X 4
Loss of Apply Available
RT1 Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing DoS Availability $65,000 0% D Patch $1,600 5 3 X 5
Loss of Apply Available
RT2 Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing DoS Availability $65,000 0% D Patch $1,600 6 4 X 6
Sun Java System Web / Application
Server Malformed Client Certificate Loss of Upgrade
APS1 DoS Availability 65,000 0% D Software $1,600 7 5 X 7
Sun Java System Web / Application
Server Malformed Client Certificate Loss of Upgrade
APS2 DoS Availability 65,000 0% D Software $1,600 8 6 X 8
Loss of Upggrade
WS1 Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing DoS Availability $25,000 0% D Software $1,600 9 7 X 9
Loss of Upggrade
WS2 Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing DoS Availability $25,000 0% D Software $11600 10 8 X 10
Loss of Upggrade
WS3 Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing DoS Availability $25,000 0% D Software $1,600 11 9 X 11
oss of 9re
W54 Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing DoS Availability $25,000 0% D Software $1,600 12 10 X 12
The manufacturer's budget of $350,000 is large enough to accommodate performing all of the
actions required to mitigate the risk that has
losses for the attacks involving information
been identified in this system. The expected value of
integrity issues are again, much higher than the loss
of availability results. The vulnerability causing the potential information integrity issue is
another SQL injection vulnerability causing the database to perform actions that are not part of
the regular website operation. In this case, the SQL injection vulnerability can be exploited by an
attacker that inserts nefarious commands into injection points, using generic error messages
generated by the database in order to enumerate the tables in the database for further attack
(Scambray and Shema, 2002). While the vulnerability is referred to as SQL injection, many
databases including the Oracle database in the manufacturer's system are vulnerable to this
phenomenon caused by insecure coding practices. The mitigation of this vulnerability requires a
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programmer to make sure that any error messages returned by the database to the browser are
generic, that the filtering of meta-characters is in place, that the type of input is defined in each
parameter, and that the input meets that definition. For example, if a parameter is expected to be
an integer and an input containing a non-integer is submitted, it should be discarded and a non-
specific error returned. All parameters should also have maximum length defined. The cost of
this project is the cost of a programmer at $150 per hour working for four weeks and totals
$24,000.
The other vulnerabilities on the manufacturer's system all result in a loss of availability. The
manufacturer's system shares two vulnerabilities with the distributor system. The manufacturer
router and web servers are both are susceptible to the "Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parking DoS"
(OSVDB, 2005) vulnerability. The manufacturer's application servers are also vulnerable to the
Sun Java System server Malformed Client Certificate DoS. As described above, the mitigation of
these vulnerabilities will cost $1600 per device.
The manufacturer's Cisco PIX 535 firewall is vulnerable to a denial of service attack caused by
attackers sending ICMP messages that cause a reduction in the TCP connection throughput. The
"ICMP Implementation Malformed Path MTU DoS" (OSVDB, 2005) affects multiple vendors
including Cisco. This vulnerability has a high probability of being attacked due to the exploit
being widely published and that the target, being a $500 million company's security device. This
vulnerability requires an upgrade of the software, and therefore it has been assigned a cost of
$1600 per device for testing, implementation and documentation of the upgrade process.
As there is no budgetary constraint on this mitigation plan, rather than using the plan to make
choices, the manufacturer is in the enviable position of using it as a tool for the prioritization of
60
human resources. It would make sense for the manufacturer to employ a parallel effort to address
the SQL injection vulnerability and the network infrastructure vulnerabilities at the same time, as
the skill sets of the individuals working on each are different.
6.4.4 Customer
Table 20: Customer Mitigation Plan with Budgetary Constraints
"PC1 Buffe r Overflow :negr $150,00 80% B Sfwar $20 1X1
ES1 Do vailability $19,00 10% C Software $1,6X
ICMP Implementation
FW1 DoS Availability $19,00 100 C So tware $1,6 X
The personal computer in the network has the highest expected value of loss due to having a
vulnerable version of Yahoo Messenger installed (SANS, 2005). The version of messenger
installed on this system is susceptible to a buffer overflow attack. A buffer is a memory storage
area that can overflow, if it is too small or the data being stored is inefficiently parsed. These
overflows can be intentionally performed by attackers who use the overflow as a way to execute
commands into other parts of the system, often resulting in information integrity issues (Merkow
and Breithaupt, 2000). By addressing the buffer overflow vulnerability on the personal computer
through upgrading the Yahoo Messenger application, the customer can decrease the expected
value of loss by 80%, while only spending 13% of their $1500 budget. This upgrade is very
inexpensive due to it being a simple task on a non-complex system and should only take an
administrator a total of two hours.
The other two vulnerabilities are the "ICMP Implementation Malformed Path MTU DoS"
(OSVDB, 2005) vulnerability, as already described in Section 6.4.3, affecting the manufacturer's
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Cisco PIX 535 Firewall. In the customer system, the Cisco PIX 501 Firewall and the Windows
2003/Exchange Email Server are affected by this vulnerability. The fix for this vulnerability is a
software upgrade as provided by the vendors. As discussed above, the cost of a software upgrade
is estimated at $1600. This upgrade cost includes extensive testing and the backing up of files.
Due to the relatively simple network and cost constraints, an abbreviated process for the upgrade
might be considered by the customer in an attempt to stay within the budget.
6.5 Sensitivity Analysis
There are two areas of this risk assessment that required the introduction of subjective variables.
In order to assess the validity of the values assigned to these variables, and the impact of those
choices on the overall outcome of the analysis, a sensitivity analysis for each of those variables
was performed. The sensitivity analysis was performed on the assigning of probabilities of a
successful exploit of a vulnerability occurring and the assessment of outcomes stemming from an
unauthorized result.
The method by which probabilities were determined and the way they are employed in this study
might be better described as relative probabilities. By scoring characteristics of the vulnerability
and then using that to determine the probabilities, the likelihood of a vulnerability occurring was
given weighting relative to other vulnerabilities. The range of the possible probabilities used in
the study was from 10% likelihood to 100% likelihood. By shrinking that range to 5% to 50%
and then 50% to 100%, 1 found that the ranking of assets by expected value of loss was
unchanged. By continuing to assume a linear relationship based on the scoring of the
vulnerabilities as described, the probability assigned did adjusting the value of the expected value
of loss, but it did not affect the expected value of loss ranking of assets. Performing this analysis
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with a non-linear relationship between the score and probabilities assigned would also be
interesting but has not been performed.
Changes in the outcomes have the most significant impact on the expected value of loss. The
assignment of the outcomes to the three unauthorized results is another subjective portion of the
analysis. For example, if the manufacturer were to decide that the nature of their business was
such that in the event of a loss of availability instead of reclaiming 90% of the orders that were
expected to be placed in the outage period, they only reclaimed 10%, this would increase the
expected outcome by close to a factor of 10. At the same time, if the manufacturer decided that
the impact on the long term commitment by the customer was only 1% of the customer base
defecting due to an information integrity issue, rather than 10% that would reduce the expected
value of loss by 80%. However, even these significant adjustments in the outcomes leave the
rankings of projects based upon expected value of loss unchanged, as the impact of lost
customers is so much greater than lost orders. Given the above, if the ranking of the projects
were to be affected, the loss of availability would have to continue for 10 days in order for the
value of the expected value of loss due to lost orders to exceed the expected value of loss for
customer defection following information disclosure.
Despite the significant changes in the expected value of loss that can be achieved through
changing the assumptions supporting the incident outcomes, the ranking of the projects is
relatively stable. If the purpose of this assessment is to highlight areas of risk and indicate the
priority of projects, there needs to be little concern over the exact calculation of the outcomes. If
the outcomes are applied uniformly within the system, the criticality and priority as indicated by
the relative expected value of loss should be consistent. The changes in outcomes will however,
significantly change the dollar value of the risk per asset and overall system risk. If there is a
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need for a high-level of accuracy in the expected value of loss for the purpose of considering
insurance or reporting risk as part of a regulatory process, the investment of time for the appraisal
of outcomes should be devoted accordingly.
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7 Conclusions
The quantitative risk assessment methodology discussed in this paper is comprised by a series of
phases including an asset inventory, vulnerability assessment, assignment of probabilities of
unauthorized events and determination of consequences of unauthorized outcomes. Portions of
this assessment are a fairly straightforward information gathering exercise, while other steps
require the educated speculation based on an examination of the company and the business
processes supported by the infrastructure and applications being assessed. Even the clearer cut
information gathering stages have a time-sensitive nature that must be taken into account.
Additionally, by understanding the areas within this assessment that are less straightforward and
may require explanation and justification, a practitioner seeking to perform this type of
assessment will be better prepared to both carry-out and then defend the results.
The asset inventory and the vulnerability assessment are the steps in the process that can be
classified as clear information gathering. Both can be primarily performed with automated
scanning, and while some analysis of vulnerabilities is recommended, the data gathered is
relatively objective and can be counted on to be repeatable by others performing the same tests.
The data that is generated gives a snap shot of the situation within the system at the time that the
data gathering is completed.
The one area where this data can be questioned is its timeliness. The information security stance
of a system is constantly changing. Assets are added and removed from the network and with
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them the expected losses associated with the asset. Vulnerabilities are constantly being
discovered, released to the public and then exploited. In order to be confident of the findings
from the assessment, the data used as the base of this analysis should be regularly updated. By
linking the outputs from automated scans to a database for this purposed, the task of continual
updating could be made manageable.
There are other phases of the quantitative risk assessment that are subject to the discretion of the
individuals performing the assessment. Assessing the outcomes of unauthorized results in the
system is the most subjective process outlined in this study. The process for this phase as
outlined in this methodology involves a discussion within the company to determine the possible
outcomes by considering some quantifiable characteristics of the company such as size, business
model, and number of customers, and then other non-quantifiable characteristics such as the type
and strength of partner relationships. Once each of these characteristics of the business is
determined, they are used as a basis for a subjective assessment of one of the main consequences
considered, partner behavior. Predicting the response of customers to an information security
breach at a particular company is highly subjective. If this process were to be more objective, the
company being assessed would need historical data, which reflected the customer response to
each unauthorized event, in order to better predict outcomes.
While changing the severity of the consequences associated with an unauthorized event can have
a large impact on the expected values of losses and the ranking of projects, its subjective nature is
defendable. The process of assigning the consequences by consulting the business makes it
inherently reflect the tolerance within the business for unauthorized results. A perception by the
business that a loss of availability would be crippling due to customer response to an outage will
mean that vulnerabilities producing that result will be more heavily weighted. As long as the
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same outcomes for a loss of availability are applied throughout the system, the risk analysis
results will provide a consistent means by which to rank the mitigation projects.
The process required to perform a quantitative risk assessment of a system is not trivial. In a
large system with hundreds of assets, the initial assessment could take months. Once the initial
assessment is completed the changing nature of the security landscape could impinge the
accuracy of the assessment almost immediately. However, with the aid of some automatic testing
tools for both maintaining the asset inventory and vulnerability assessment, the quantitative risk
assessment process is very useful in identifying critical areas of a system and prioritizing the
work required to mitigate the risk.
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8 Future Research
Quantitative risk assessments of systems' information security stance have not been widely
researched. They are being carried out within companies, but there are some issues that hinder
the assessment and cause the results to be questioned. The lack of historical data for determining
the probabilities of incidents occurring and their outcomes makes the process of determining
those values difficult and the results difficult to defend. The threat profile of a company can also
evolve in a short period of time as a vulnerability progresses through the lifecycle of discovery to
patch, with the status of the exploit changing throughout that time. Modeling that changing risk
profile is a challenge.
One of the main issues with performing an information security quantitative risk assessment is
that the lack historical data for determining probabilities of vulnerabilities being exploited and the
outcomes resulting from a successful exploit. The relatively small number of incidents that occur
within each company, and the hesitance of companies to report information security incidents
have resulted in a lack of historical data regarding the consequences experienced by companies
following a successful attack. Further efforts need to be made to develop historical data around
information security incidents. Collecting data across organizations related to the probability of a
vulnerability being exploited on a system would be very valuable. Additionally, further
quantitative documentation of the outcomes following a successful exploit should be collected.
By building historical stores of data regarding information security incidents, the need to use
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subjective probabilities and develop subjective outcomes would be reduced, and the accuracy of
risk assessments would be improved.
In order to be able to better model the stochastic nature of a vulnerability's lifecycle, further work
should be done to develop a method for modeling the likelihood of different scenarios as a
vulnerability's threat level evolves from release, through discovery of an exploit and the
distribution of that exploit to the community. Developing such a model would provide the ability
to look at the evolving threat profile of a vulnerability on an asset over a number of time periods
to provide a better method for the prioritizing mitigation projects. Organizations are often limited
in terms of the patching activities that they can perform by human resources. Modeling methods
that support decision making for the development of ongoing mitigation plans are of great
interests to many information security practitioners today.
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A Appendix A
Manufacturer Database Cost of Loss of Availability Calculation
Numbers highlighted in yellow are used in target calculation. Numbers highlighted in blue are
the result of calculation
Length of Outage
1 day (Assumption of Assessment)
Number of Databases
2 databases (As per network design)
Revenue Transacted during Outage
Annual Revenue = $500,000,000
Number Trading Days Per Year = 251
Average Revenue Per Day = $500,000,000/251 = $1,992,000/Day
Percentage of Transactions Lost During Outage
10% (Outcome as Determined by Subjective Analysis)
Consequence of Loss of Availability to Database
Consequence = (10% * $1,992,000)/2=
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Manufacturer Database Cost of Loss of Information Integrity Calculation
Numbers highlighted in yellow are used in target calculation. Numbers highlighted in blue are
the result of calculation
Cost of Customer Loss
Annual Revenue from Each Customer = Annual Revenue/Number of Customers
= $500,000,000/Year/500 customers = $1,000,000 Revenue/ Customer/Year
Percentage Customers Lost = 10% (Assumption of Assessment)
Number Customers Lost = 500 Customers * 10% = 50 Customers
Cost of Customers Lost Annually = 50 Customers*$ 1,000,000/Customer/ Year
$50,000,000/Year
Cost of Regulatory Fine
Regulatory Fine = $1,000,000 (Assumption of Assessment)
Cost of Labor to Restore Database
Average Hourly Rate for DBA = $150/Hour (Assumption of Assessment)
Number Hours to Restore Data = 160 Hours (Assumption of Assessment)
Cost of Labor = $150/Hour * 160 Hours = $24,000
Total Consequence of Loss of Information Integrity to Database
(Lost Customers+Regulatory+Labor)/Number of Databases
($50,000,000+$ 1,000,000 + $24,000)/2=
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Manufacturer Database Cost of Information Disclosure Calculation
Numbers highlighted in yellow are used in target calculation. Numbers highlighted in blue are
the result of calculation
Consequence of Customer Loss
Annual Revenue from Each Customer = Annual Revenue/Number of Customers
= $500,000,000/Year/500 customers = $1,000,000 Revenue/ Customer/Year
Percentage Customers Lost = 5% (Assumption of Assessment)
Number Customers Lost = 500 Customers * 5% = 25 Customers
Cost of Customers Lost Annually = 50 Customers*$ 1,000,000/Customer/ Year
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B Appendix B
Table 21 provides the list of vulnerabilities studied in this assessment and the corresponding
URL's that provide descriptions of the vulnerabilities on the Open Source Vulnerabilities
Database, SANS Top 20 List and Security Focus Website.
Table 21: Vulnerability Reference
Maiicious coue inserrea uue 10 IaCK 0 ( valluauoL' pidII1e1uIZ,
leading making it possible for users to see each other's
unfs Hac~kingi Expos~ed INA
Cross Site SNcr!"i IPv6 URI parsing routines in the apr-util libmry for Apache
HTTP Server and IBM HTTP Server contains a flaw that may
Apache 2 apr-util IPV6 Parsing DoS allow a inmote denial of service OSVDB/ID: 9994 http://www.osvdb.com/displayvuln.php?osvdb 
id=9994
Sun Java System Web / Application
Server Malformed Client Certificate The issue is triggered by the use of malformed client
DoS certificates, and will result in loss of availability for the server. OSVDB/ID: 11383 http://www.osvdb.com/displayvuln.php?osvdb 
id=11384
HTTP Server Format String Check Point FireWall-I HTTP Server Format String OSVDB/ID: 4414 http://www.osvdb.com/displayvuln.php?osvdb 
id=4414
D-Link Router DHCP Request Flood
DoS D-Link Router DHCP Request Flood DoS OSVDB/ID: 7287 http://www.osvdb.com/displayvuln.php?osvdb 
id=7287
SQL Injection SQL Injection poosible in all application input fields Hacking Exposed N/A
Triggered due to the handling of ICMP error messages and
ICMP Implementation Malformed Path when the "Path MTU Discovery" (PMTUD) mechanism is
MTU DoS used OSVDB/ID: 15619 http://www.osvdb.com/displayvuln.php?osvdb 
id=15619
SANS 20 and http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/9145 -
Buffer Overflow Old version of Yahoo Messenger Bugtraq/ID 9145 http://www.sans.org/top20/#w1
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